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Tarmizi bin Yacob & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) ARIFIN ZAKARIA CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) AND JAMES FOONG FCJ CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS 05–37 OF 2004 (W) AND 05–38 OF 2004 (W) Federal Court:

[2011] 4 MLJ 1
Tarmizi bin Yacob & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal
FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA)

ARIFIN ZAKARIA CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) AND JAMES FOONG FCJ

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS 05–37 OF 2004 (W) AND 05–38 OF 2004 (W)

27 July 2010
Criminal Procedure — Prosecution — Consent of public prosecutor — Charge amended from s 39B(1)(a) to s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 — Amendment made by deputy public prosecutor at trial — Whether trial a nullity — Whether informer should have been called to testify — Whether appellants acted together with common intention in preparing sale of cannabis

The appellants in both the appeals herein were convicted under s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’) and sentenced to death. Their appeal to the Federal Court was against the dismissal of their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence. Initially both appellants were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the DDA but at the end of the prosecution’s case the deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one under s 39B(1)(c), to wit, that they, in furtherance of a common intention, carried out an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in 2,996.4g cannabis.

The prosecution’s narration of the events was that a chief inspector of police (PW10), posing as a drug buyer, was introduced by his informer (‘Mud’) to the second appellant to discuss the purchase of cannabis. At the appointed time and place for the sale and purchase to take place PW10 met with both appellants. While PW10 and the second appellant waited, the first appellant went to get the drugs and returned in about 20 minutes carrying a bag from which the first appellant took out and showed the cannabis to PW10. PW10 signalled the police party that lay in ambush observing the proceedings. The appellants fled on seeing the police approaching; the first appellant throwing away the bag he was carrying as he fled. Both appellants were apprehended by the police after a brief struggle. In calling for their defence the trial court found as a fact that both appellants had a common intention in acting together to ensure the sale of the cannabis and that they had knowledge of the drugs as inferred from their attempts to resist arrest and escape the police party and the act of the first appellant in throwing away the bag containing the drugs. Their defence failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. In the Federal Court the appellants submitted that (i) the trial was a nullity because the public prosecutor had not consented to the charge being amended (ii) the prosecution ought to have called the informer ‘Mud’ to testify and/or offered him to the defence (iii) as the second appellant only negotiated the sale of the

4 MLJ 1 at 2

cannabis with PW10 and was never in possession of the drugs he was not involved in trafficking and (iv) as the first appellant did not participate in the negotiations or in the preparatory act but only had custody and control of the cannabis he should be found guilty of only possession and not trafficking.The prosecution replied that (i) consent to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor (ii) Mud was not an agent provocateur but only an informer whose identity was protected by s 40 of the DDA. Mud merely introduced the second appellant to PW10 and did nothing else and (iii) the appellants acted together, with a common intention, to sell the cannabis to PW10.

Held, dismissing the appeals and affirming the appellants’ conviction and sentence:

  • (1)
    Consent of the public prosecutor to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by the deputy public prosecutor in which case the consent of the public prosecutor was implicit in his actions and no further written consent of the public prosecutor was required:Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 followed. Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 not followed (see paras 35 & 33).
  • (2)
    There was no necessity for the evidence of Mud in the narrative of the prosecution’s case. It was not disputed that the only role Mud played was to introduce PW10 to the second appellant. Just because Mud was known to the second appellant did not make him an agent provocateur (see para 43).
  • (3)
    In this case the trafficking was the sale of cannabis or the purchase of it by PW10. What transpired on the night of 5 April 1996 was the final chapter in the preparation of the trafficking of the drugs which constituted the supply and delivery of 3kg of the cannabis by the first appellant for the purpose of both the appellants jointly handing it over to PW10 in exchange for payment as earlier agreed. There was common intention to ensure the sale of the cannabis to PW10 (see paras 48 & 49).
  • (4)
    To constitute actual delivery it was not necessary that the agreed price had to be paid upon or before the physical delivery of the drugs. Here, the transaction was completed when the appellants produced the cannabis to PW10 and were only waiting for payment (see para 50).
  • (5)
    There was no misdirection in the evaluation of the evidence adduced or in the standard of proof applied by the trial judge in coming to his decision. Overwhelming evidence was adduced showing the roles played by the appellants to make the cannabis available to PW10 for purchase. The very act of each of them attempting to flee from the scene to avoid

    4 MLJ 1 at 3

    arrest by the police was a clear indication both of them knew what they were dealing in with PW10 (see paras 51 & 52).

Perayu-perayu di dalam kedua-dua rayuan telah disabitkan di bawah s 39B(1)(c) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (‘ADB’) dan telah dihukum mati. Rayuan mereka kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan adalah terhadap penolakan rayuan mereka masing-masing kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. Pada awalnya, kedua-dua perayu telah dituduh di bawah s 39B(1)(a) ADB tetapi pada akhir kes pihak pendakwaan timbalan pendakwa raya telah meminda tuduhan kepada satu yang tertakluk di bawah s 39B(1)(c), iaitu, bahawa mereka, sebagai lanjutan niat bersama, telah melakukan tindakan persediaan kepada atau bagi tujuan pengedaran 2,996.4g kanabis. Penceritaan kejadian pihak pendakwaan adalah bahawa ketua penyiasat polis (‘PW10’), menyamar sebagai pembeli dadah, telah diperkenalkan oleh pemberi maklumat (‘Mud’) kepada perayu kedua untuk berbincang tentang pembelian kanabis. Pada masa dan tempat yang ditetapkan bagi jual beli tersebut, PW10 bertemu dengan kedua-dua perayu. Sementara PW10 dan perayu kedua sedang menunggu, perayu pertama pergi mendapatkan dadah dan pulang selepas 20 minit membawa beg di mana perayu mengeluarkan dan menunjukkan kanabis kepada PW10. PW10 memberi isyarat kepada pihak polis yang sedang berselindung di dalam belukar dan memerhatikan prosiding tersebut. Perayu-perayu terus melarikan diri apabila melihat kedatangan polis; perayu pertama membuang beg yang dibawanya semasa dia melarikan diri. Kedua-dua perayu telah ditangkap oleh polis selepas pergelutan singkat. Dalam memanggil pembelaan mereka, mahkamah perbicaraan mendapati adalah fakta bahawa kedua-kedua perayu mempunyai niat bersama untuk bertindak bersesama untuk memastikan jualan kanabis dan bahawa mereka mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah tersebut melihatkan kepada percubaan mereka untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan dan melarikan diri daripada pihak polis dan tindakan perayu pertama membuang beg yang mengandungi dadah tersebut. Pembelaan mereka gagal untuk meletakkan sebarang keraguan berpatutan ke atas kes pendakwaan.

Dalam Mahkamah Persekutuan, perayu-perayu berhujah bahawa (i) perbicaraan adalah terbatal oleh kerana pendakwa raya tidak memberi kebenaran terhadap tuduhan yang dipinda; (ii) pihak pendakwaan sepatutnya memanggil pemberi maklumat ‘Mud’ untuk memberi keterangan dan/atau menawarkannya kepada pembelaan; (iii) memandangkan perayu kedua hanya berunding tentang penjualan kanabis dengan PW10 dan tidak pernah dalam milikan dadah tersebut, dia tidak terbabit dalam pengedaran; dan (iv) memandangkan perayu pertama tidak terlibat dalam perundingan atau tindakan persediaan tetapi hanya mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan kanabis tersebut, dia patut didapati bersalah hanya untuk milikan dan bukan untuk pengedaran. Pihak pendakwaan membalas bahawa (i) kebenaran kepada tuduhan yang dipinda tidak diperlukan memandangkan pendakwaan telah

4 MLJ 1 at 4

dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya (ii) Mud bukanlah ejen perangkap tetapi hanya pemberi maklumat yang mana identitinya dilindungi oleh s 40ADB. Mud sekadar memperkenalkan perayu kedua kepada PW10 dan tidak lebih dari itu; dan (iii) perayu-perayu bertindak bersama-sama, dengan niat bersama untuk menjual kanabis kepada PW10.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dan mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman perayu-perayu:

  • (1)
    Kebenaran pendakwa raya untuk tuduhan yang dipinda adalah tidak perlu memandangkan pendakwaan telah dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya di mana kebenaran pendakwa raya adalah tersirat daripada tindakannya dan kebenaran bertulis selanjutnya oleh pendakwa raya adalah tidak perlu: Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 diikut; Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 tidak diikut (lihat perenggan 35 & 33).
  • (2)
    Keterangan Mud adalah tidak perlu di dalam penceritaan kes pihak pendakwaan. Tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa peranan yang dimainkan oleh Mud hanyalah untuk memperkenalkan PW10 kepada perayu kedua. Hanya kerana Mud dikenali oleh perayu kedua tidak bermakna dia adalah ejen perangkap (lihat perenggan 43).
  • (3)
    Dalam kes ini pengedaran tersebut adalah penjualan kanabis atau pembeliannya oleh PW10. Apa yang berlaku pada malam 5 April 1996 adalah bab terakhir dalam persediaan untuk pengedaran dadah yang mana membawa kepada bekalan dan penyerahan 3kg kanabis oleh perayu pertama bagi tujuan untuk diberikan kepada PW10 oleh kedua-dua perayu sebagai ganti untuk pembayaran yang dipersetujui sebelum itu. Terdapat niat bersama untuk memastikan penjualan kanabis kepada PW10(lihat perenggan 48 & 49).
  • (4)
    Untuk membentuk penyerahan sebenar, adalah tidak perlu bahawa harga yang dipersetujui hendaklah dibayar apabila atau sebelum penyerahan fizikal dadah tersebut. Di sini, transaksi telah disempurnakan apabila perayu-perayu menyediakan kanabis kepada PW10 dan hanya menunggu untuk bayaran (lihat perenggan 50).
  • (5)
    Tidak terdapat salah arah dalam penilaian keterangan yang dikemukakan atau standard pembuktian yang digunakan oleh hakim bicara dalam membuat keputusannya. Keterangan kukuh yang dikemukakan menunjukkan peranan yang dimainkan oleh perayu-perayu untuk menyediakan kanabis untuk pembelian oleh PW10. Tindakan setiap daripada mereka yang cuba untuk melarikan diri daripada tempat kejadian untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan oleh polis adalah petunjuk yang jelas bahawa kedua-duanya tahu akan urusniaga mereka dengan PW10 (lihat perenggan 51 & 52).
4 MLJ 1 at 5
Notes

For cases on consent of Public Prosecutor to prosecute, see 5(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reissue) paras 3093–3095.

Cases referred to

Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v PP [1995] 3 SLR 701, HC (refd)

Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1, CA (refd)

Lee Lee Chong v PP [1998] 4 MLJ 697, CA (refd)

Pendakwa Raya v Mansor bin Mohd Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 560, FC (refd)

PP v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 (refd)

PP v Sa’ari Jusoh [2007] 2 CLJ 197, FC (refd)

Ti Chuee Hiang v PP [1995] 2 MLJ 433, SC (refd)

Legislation referred to

Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ss 2, 39B(1)(a), (1)(c), 39B(2), 40A

Penal Code s 34

Appeal From: Criminal Appeal Nos W–05–53 of 1997 and W–05–54 of 1997 (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya).
Gurbachan Singh (Ratnam with him) (Bachan & Kartar) for the appellants.
Ahmad Bache (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
Jaya Prakash watching brief for the Indonesian Consulate.

Richard Malanjum FCJ (delivering judgment of the court)
INTRODUCTION

[1] There are two appeals before us heard together. In both the appeals the respective appellants were convicted and sentenced to death on the amended charge under s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘the Act’) read with s 34 of the Penal Code and punishable under s 39B(2) of the Act by the High Court Kuala Lumpur on 5 August 1997. Their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal were dismissed on 2 December 2004. They now appeal to this court on 15 grounds of appeal.

[2] Initially both the appellants were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the Act read with s 34 of the same Code and punishable under s 39B(2) of the Act. However, at the end of the case for the prosecution the learned deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one of s 39B(1)(c) of the Act.

[3] In this judgment the appellant in the first appeal is described as the first appellant and the appellant in the second appeal as the second appellant and

4 MLJ 1 at 6

together as the appellants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUNDS

[4] The amended charge preferred against the appellants in the High Court reads:

Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 5 April 1996, lebih kurang 9.45 malam, di Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, dalam mencapai niat bersama, kamu telah di pihak kamu melakukan satu perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah berbahaya, iaitu 2996.4 gram cannabis, suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(c)Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Disemak 1980) dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2)Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

[5] It is the case for the prosecution that on 4 April 1996 at around 5pm. Chief Inspector Amir Hamzah bin Hanudin (‘PW10’) from the Unit Risikan Jenayah Ibu Pejabat Bukit Aman, acting as a drug buyer, was introduced by his source a person known as Mud to Agam, the second appellant, an Indonesian, at the Restoran Hashimah Paya Jaras, Sungai Buluh.

[6] After Mud had introduced PW10 to the second appellant he asked Mud to leave. PW10 then began discussion with the second appellant. PW10 informed the second appellant that he wished to buy 10 kilo of drugs ‘ganja’ (‘cannabis’). The second appellant agreed to supply at the price of RM1,700 per kilo. PW10 did not agree on the price. Further negotiation took place on the price and it was finally agreed at RM1,600 per kilo. The second appellant then told PW10 that the cannabis was at Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur in the area of Jalan Raja Alang and could only be collected in the evening or at night.

[7] At about 7pm on the same evening the second appellant invited PW10 to come with him to Kampung Baru to collect the cannabis. PW10 drove his car, a red GTO Mitsubishi with registration No WDX 983. The second appellant sat on the passenger seat.

[8] On arrival at the place the second appellant went out for 15–20 minutes but only to come back to say that the cannabis was not yet available. The second appellant then told PW10 they were to return to Paya Jaras and on the way back the second appellant informed PW10 that the cannabis could not be obtained that evening as it was not safe to do so. The second appellant then said to PW10 that he could get someone to deliver the cannabis at Paya Jaras with an additional payment of RM300. PW10 disagreed and advised the second appellant that if there was any further development he was to call him on his

4 MLJ 1 at 7

mobile phone. In reply the second appellant asked PW10 to come to Kampung Baru at the same location around 3pm the next day.[9] At around 11.30am the next day PW10 went to the Operation Room of the Narcotics Department Task Force of the Bukit Aman Police Headquarters at Cheras to brief the members of the task force (‘the police’) on the pending transaction at Jalan Raja Alang Kampung Baru in which he would pose as a buyer of the cannabis.

[10] It was therefore agreed during the briefing:

  • (a)
    that the police would focus on the agreed location;
  • (b)
    that PW10 would used the same car; and
  • (c)
    that the police would move to ambush only after PW10 had given the signal by opening the boot of his car.

[11] At around 7.50pm on 5 April 1996 the second appellant called PW10 on his mobile phone. The first four calls of the same number PW10 did not answer. It was only the fifth call that he answered and it was the second appellant.

[12] Over the phone the second appellant told PW10 that the cannabis was available and that PW10 was to come to Jalan Raja Alang in front of Yuli Clinic at around 9pm. PW10 agreed.

[13] PW10 then informed the police who were with him at the Golf Club PDRM of the agreed location and emphasised to them that the seller would be entering his car.

[14] PW10 arrived at the designated location at about 9.10pm and knew that the police had also arrived due to the presence of one member in short pants near the public telephone booth. PW10 parked his car under a street light in order to have clear sight of what might happen.

[15] At about 9.20pm the second appellant arrived with another person introduced to PW10 as Tarmizi, the first appellant. PW10 asked both of them to enter his car. The first appellant was seated on the front passenger seat while the second appellant was at the back seat. The first appellant proceeded to inform PW10 that he only had 3kg of the cannabis. PW10 agreed to buy and the first appellant asked for payment.

[16] When the first appellant asked for the money PW10 showed him and said that he would only pay upon seeing the cannabis. The first appellant

4 MLJ 1 at 8

therefore went out of the car walking to the rear of the car towards a corner not far from it. PW10 then asked the second appellant to come to the front seat.[17] While waiting for the first appellant PW10 was informed by the second appellant that only 3kg could be obtained for the transaction but he would arrange again next time.

[18] After about 15–20 minutes the first appellant came back. PW10 asked the second appellant to come out with him and moved to the rear of the car. The three met at the rear of the car. The first appellant told PW10 he had the cannabis inside the bag he was carrying. The first appellant brought it in front of PW10 and the second appellant. From inside the bag the first appellant proceeded to take out a compact bundle wrapped with transparent plastics. PW10 smelt it, looked at it and pressed it before suspecting it was cannabis.

[19] The first appellant and second appellant asked PW10 to be quick. PW10 went to get the money inside the car but at the same time pulling the lever to open the boot to signal the police to act. At that time the cannabis was still with the first appellant. When PW10 was about to return to the rear of the car he saw the police heading for the first appellant and second appellant. PW10 went back into his car, turned on the engine and sped off.

[20] The transaction between PW10 and the appellants were witnessed by Chief Inspector Fisol (‘PW5’) who led the police that night and Det Cpl Rosdi (‘PW8’). They were about 10–15 meters away from the car of PW10. They identified the first appellant as a tall, well-built man wearing a red short–sleeve T–shirt and dark jeans while the second appellant was wearing a white T–shirt and dark pants.

[21] When the signal to act came on PW5 and PW8 ran to apprehend the first appellant and second appellant respectively. However after a struggle with PW5 the first appellant managed to free himself and threw away the bag he was carrying before running away. PW5 did not pursue him but stayed back to watch over the bag thrown by the first appellant. It was Inspector Zambri who made another attempt to apprehend the first appellant. He too failed. He was injured when he was pushed and fell down. The first appellant was then pursued by Det Cpl Khalid (‘PW7’) who managed to arrest him after firing two shots at him and injuring his right leg. Several members of the police also came to assist PW7. The second appellant also tried to escape but was caught by PW8 with the help of Det Sjn Abdullah.

[22] The first appellant and second appellant were both identified by PW7 and PW8 as the two persons with PW10 that night based on their clothing.

4 MLJ 1 at 9

[23] After the arrest of the first appellant and second appellant PW5 examined the content of the bag in their presence. PW5 found three compressed slabs suspected to be cannabis. PW6, the chemist, (Cheong Meow Kioon) did the analysis of the three slabs seized by the police. In his evidence PW6 said that he was given three compressed slabs of plant material wrapped with plastic sheet and secured with adhesive tape. He found the nett weight of each slab to be 1,018.4g, 991.4g and 986.6g respectively and giving the total weight of 2,996.4g. And after he had carried out the essential analysis on the three slabs by way of several established and accepted tests he found all the plant material of the three slabs to be cannabis as defined in s 2 of the Act.

[24] At the end of the case for the prosecution and after giving the maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution the learned High Court judge called for the defence of both the first appellant and second appellant. In doing so he made several findings of fact related to the issues raised by learned counsel for the first appellant and second appellant, inter alia:

  • (a)
    that the first appellant and second appellant were identified by PW10 and corroborated by PW5, PW7 and PW8. In addition both the first appellant and second appellant were arrested at the scene of the event;
  • (b)
    that the identification of the first appellant and second appellant was possible that night since the views of the prosecution’s witnesses who observed the event were not hampered. There were street lights and building lights in the vicinity;
  • (c)
    that PW6 concluded that the three slabs he analysed were cannabis as defined in s 2 of the Act;
  • (d)
    that the first appellant and second appellant had the common intention since they acted together in the preparation for the sale of the cannabis; and
  • (e)
    that the first appellant and second appellant had knowledge of the cannabis. The acts of the first appellant in struggling with the police to resist arrest, throwing the bag containing the cannabis and running away indicated such knowledge. And so was the second appellant who also struggled with the police in an attempt to escape.

[25] The learned trial High Court judge did not think that the failure by the Prosecution to tender as evidence the Police Report Dang Wangi No 7049/96 had jeopardised the prosecution’s case as he opined it was not a first information report. And neither did the learned trial High Court judge find any break in the chain of evidence adduced by the prosecution. The evidence of PW10 was also held to be admissible under s 40A of the Act.

4 MLJ 1 at 10

[26] In his unsworn statement the first appellant said that he happened to be at the scene of the event when he heard shouts of ‘Polis, polis, polis’. As he was an illegal immigrant and feared of being apprehended he ran off. In the process he dropped his watch and while looking for it he heard a gun shot and felt pain on his right thigh. He fainted.

[27] The learned trial High Court judge did not find the version of the first appellant as having cast any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. His reasons were as follows:

  • (a)
    that the first appellant did not deny that he was at the scene of the event that night;
  • (b)
    that there was no reason why the police would go for the first appellant if indeed there were other people in the vicinity at that time. Further it was illogical for the first appellant to say that he ran away as he was an illegal immigrant yet gave his watch a priority when he stopped to look for it at the risk of being arrested; and
  • (c)
    that there was nothing in the statement of the first appellant to contradict the evidence of the prosecution that at that time he was carrying a bag containing the cannabis and which he threw away when the police wanted to arrest him.

[28] The second appellant also made an unsworn statement from the dock. He said that on 4 April 1996 he did meet Mud with another person introduced to him as Abang Jo at the restaurant in Paya Jaras. While at the restaurant Mud and Abang Jo agreed to meet at Jalan Raja Alang the next day. The second appellant went on to say that he met Mud on 5 April 1996 at Jalan Raja Alang. Mud told him that there was a man in a car who asked him to go in. The second appellant said that he followed but did not enter the car. Then suddenly he heard gun shots and the shouts of ‘Polis, polis’. He was subsequently arrested.

[29] Having heard the version of the second appellant the learned trial High Court judge did not find it having cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case for the following reasons:

  • (a)
    the second appellant did not deny that he was at the scene of the event that night;
  • (b)
    the second appellant did not say who was the man inside the car;
  • (c)
    the second appellant did not deny that he struggled with the police; and
  • (d)
    there was no reason or even suggested reason why the police would arrest the second appellant.
4 MLJ 1 at 11

[30] The learned trial High Court judge thus found both the first appellant and second appellant guilty of the charge preferred against them. He convicted and sentenced them accordingly.

[31] The Court of Appeal dismissed the respective appeals of the appellants. Briefly, the Court of Appeal held:

  • (a)
    that preparatory act for the purpose of trafficking drugs consists of several continuing acts;
  • (b)
    that the evidence of the chemist (‘PW6’) was credible. There was no necessity for him to show in detail what he did in his laboratory; and
  • (c)
    that the consent of the public prosecutor was implied in this case since the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor.

[32] Before us learned counsel for the appellants only pursued grounds of Appeal Nos 13, 14 and 15. But he raised the issue of absence of consent of the public prosecutor for the amended charge.

ISSUE OF CONSENT ON THE AMENDED CHARGE

[33] Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial of his clients was a nullity in view of the absence of consent to the amended charge preferred against them at the close of the case for the prosecution. He cited the case of Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45. In that case the original charge was under s 39B(1)(a) of the Act but on the day of trial the learned deputy public prosecutor amended it to s 39A(1)(c) of the same Act. Harun J (as he then was) said this at p 1:

It will be observed that although the original and amended charges are two distinct offences, they are both created by the same section of the law viz s 39B(1) and both carry the same penalty. Both require the consent of the public prosecutor under s 39B(3). The learned deputy public prosecutor argued that the amendment was technical and as the public prosecutor had given his consent on the original charge he was at liberty to amend the charges in the manner he did. I do not think so. It was held in Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 231 that a consent to prosecute ‘is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side’. The public prosecutor has clearly exercised his mind in respect of the original charge when he gave his consent to prosecute some four months after the alleged offence. It was incumbent on him however to exercise the same degree of deliberation in respect of the amended charge. He has not done so … The facts of the case were fully before the public prosecutor at the time of giving his consent and he could have elected to proceed on the amended charge then. He did not do so. It would appear therefore that the public prosecutor

4 MLJ 1 at 12

has not given his consent to prosecute under the amended charge. That being so, the trial is a nullity on the authority of Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226.

[34] In his response the learned deputy submitted to us that consent would be superfluous in this case as the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor. In its judgment the Court of Appeal held the same view.

[35] We agree with the view of the Court of Appeal and the submission of the learned deputy. The law was concisely and correctly summarised by Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) in Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 when he said this at p 720:

The settled Malaysian position has been to consider a deputy public prosecutor as being capable of exercising all the rights and powers of the public prosecutor … It follows from this proposition that where prosecution is conducted by a DPP, the consent of the public prosecutor is implicit in his actions and no further written consent of the public prosecutor is required. Indeed, this was the holding of the Privy Council inPublic Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi [1968] 1 MLJ 148. The ruling in Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi [1968] 1 MLJ 148 was followed inPerumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265, Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155, Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Dzulkifli [1982] 1 MLJ 340 and Public Prosecutor v Lim Boon Hock [1985] 2 MLJ 219.

[36] The learned Chief Justice also noted that in Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok Harun J (as he then was) had not been referred to the Privy Council decision in Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi.

[37] And in fact Yusof Abdul Rashid J in Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Halipah declined to follow the judgment of Harun J. He preferred to follow Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi and said this at p 159:

It is to be noted that in the above case the prosecution was conducted before the High Court by a deputy public prosecutor who under the Criminal Procedure Code is vested with all the powers of the public prosecutor. On the authority of this case, it is clear that where the prosecution is conducted by a deputy public prosecutor the consent of the public prosecutor is implicit in his action and no written consent of the public prosecutor is required.

[38] In another case of Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 Mahadev Shankar JCA said this at pp 13–14:

If a deputy public prosecutor is present and goes on record when the accused is called upon to plead to an offence under this Act, no separate consent should be required (see Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226 and Perumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265).

4 MLJ 1 at 13

[39] As such we find no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants on the issue of absence of consent of the public prosecutor in respect of the amended charge.

GROUND 13 — THE FAILURE TO CALL AS A WITNESS THE INFORMER, MUD

[40] Next, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the learned judges of the Court of Appeal ‘erred and misdirected themselves in law and in fact in not holding that the informer (Mud) ought to have been called by the prosecution to unfold the narrative of the Prosecution’s case and/or offered him to the defence’. Learned counsel contended that PW10 was introduced by Mud to the second appellant and thus Mud must have been known to the second appellant. He cited the case of Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 MLJ 433 to support his contention.

[41] Learned deputy replied that Mud was only an informer hence his identity was protected by s 40 of the Act. He pointed out that Mud merely introduced the second appellant to PW10 and did nothing else. As such he was an Informer and not an agent provocateur. The learned deputy went on to say that Mud did less than the informer in Pendakwa Raya v Mansor bin Mohd Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 560 yet the Federal Court in that case ruled that the informer was not an agent provocateur when it said this at p 578:

In Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC), Mohd Azmi SCJ (now FCJ) in delivering the judgment of the court, opined (at p 494) that ‘whether a person is an informer or has become an active agent provocateur would depend on the facts of each particular case’. In our instant case under appeal though Cholar introduced PW9 to the second respondent and was present when both transactions involving cannabis were struck, there was no evidence that he had done anything apart from being present. It appears obvious that his presence during the negotiation process and the transactions was merely to lend credence to PW9’s intention to purchase the cannabis in the minds of the respondents.

On the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case under appeal, we are of the view that Cholar was not an agent provocateur. But even if he was, there is more than sufficient credible evidence of the respondents’ involvement in the negotiation and agreement to sell to PW9 the 902g of cannabis subsequently brought out by the second respondent from room ‘K’ in the said house.

[42] In its judgment the Court of Appeal held that the role of Mud in this case was merely to introduce the second appellant to PW10 unlike the informer in Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor who played an active role as an agent provocateur to arrange for the accused to meet the police and subsequently for his arrest.

4 MLJ 1 at 14

[43] We have perused the whole evidence adduced. We are of the view that there was no necessity for the evidence of Mud in the narrative of the prosecution’s case. In fact it was not disputed that the only role of Mud was to introduce PW10 to the second appellant. Just because Mud was known to the second appellant did not make him an agent provocateur. We therefore agree with the view of the Court of Appeal that the role of Mud could not be compared to that of the informer in Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor ‘who had enticed the appellant to walk into a deliberate trap, which had been planned and organised by PPP Noorhashim and executed by a team of six police officers led by K/Inspector Mohd Amin bin Abd Raof (‘PW3′) who was then attached to Cawangan Anti Dadah, Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur, on the date and at the time and place referred to in the charge’.

[44] Accordingly, we also find no merit in this issue as raised by learned counsel for the appellants.

GROUNDS 14 AND 15 — CUSTODY, CONTROL AND POSSESSION OF THE CANNABIS

[45] Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the second appellant only did the negotiation with PW10 and he was not in possession of the cannabis. As such there was no question of him involved in the trafficking of the cannabis.

[46] In respect of the first appellant’s learned counsel argued that he did not participate in the negotiation or in the preparatory act. He only had the custody and control of the cannabis. As such the presumption of possession applied and thus he should only be guilty of possession and not for trafficking. The case of Public Prosecutor v Sa’ari Jusoh [2007] 2 CLJ 197 was cited in support.

[47] In response the learned deputy submitted that the appellants were charged with common intention for the offence. And that the evidence adduced must be considered as a whole including the overwhelming evidence that the appellants acted together to effect the sale of the cannabis to PW10.

[48] On this issue the Court of Appeal held that the preparatory act for the purpose of trafficking drugs covers a number of continuing acts. It begins from an agreement until the successful handing over of the drugs to another party. The acts in between carried out to achieve the purpose included such acts as getting the supply, wrapping, sending and meeting between the parties. In this case the trafficking was the sale of cannabis or the purchase of it by PW10. And what transpired on the night of 5 April 1996 along Jalan Raja Alang was the final chapter in the preparation of the trafficking of the drugs which

4 MLJ 1 at 15

constituted the supply and delivery of 3kg of the cannabis by the first appellant for the purpose of the first appellant and second appellant jointly handing it over to PW10 in exchange for the payment as earlier agreed.[49] The appellants were charged with common intention to ensure the sale of the cannabis to PW10. And such sale was proved by direct evidence without relying on any of the statutory presumptions in the Act. We are therefore in entire agreement with the view of the Court of Appeal in finding that the contention of learned counsel for the appellants has no merit.

[50] On the issue of delivery it is now a settled law that to constitute actual delivery it is not necessary that the agreed price must be paid upon or before the physical delivery of the drugs (see Wan Mazuki bin Wan Abdullah v Public Prosecutor Criminal Appeal No 05–56 of 2008 (T). As such the decision in Public Prosecutor v Sa’ari Jusoh should not be narrowly construed. And in this case the transaction was in fact completed since the appellants had produced the cannabis to PW10 and were only waiting for the payment when the police moved in to apprehend them.

[51] In respect of the complaint that there was misdirection in the evaluation of the evidence adduced and the standard of proof applied by the learned trial High Court judge before coming to his decision, we agree with the Court of Appeal that there was no such misdirection shown or apparent.

[52] While in essence the basic defence of the appellants was one of mere denial, there were overwhelming evidence adduced indicating the roles played by the first appellant and second appellant in order to make the cannabis available for PW10 to purchase. Indeed the very act of each of them in attempting to flee from the scene and avoiding arrest by the police was one clear indication that both knew what they were dealing in with PW10 (see Lee Lee Chong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 697).

[53] As learned counsel for the appellants did not pursue the other grounds of appeal we need not have to deal with them. At any rate we are not persuaded that any of them could have made the difference to our conclusion.

[54] The respective appeals of the first appellant and second appellant are therefore dismissed. We affirmed their respective convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Appeals dismissed and appellant’s conviction and sentence affirmed.
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Tarmizi bin Yaacob dan satu lagi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2006] 6 MLJ 197 Court of Appeal:

[2006] 6 MLJ 197
Tarmizi bin Yaacob dan satu lagi lwn Pendakwa Raya
Find out more
MAHKAMAH RAYUAN (PUTRAJAYA)
ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN, MOHD GHAZALI DAN TENGKU BAHARUDIN SHAH HHMR

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO W–05–53 & 54 TAHUN 1997

18 August 2006
Acara Jenayah — Pertuduhan — Pindaan — Pindaan kepada pertuduhan pengedaran dadah berbahaya — Sama ada persetujuan diperolehi daripada Pendakwa Raya untuk pindaan tuduhan — Kanun Acara Jenayah s 376(iii)
Undang-Undang Jenayah — Dadah berbahaya — Pengedaran — Perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah — Apakah perbuatan yang merangkumi pengedaran — Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 s 39B(1)(c)

Perayu-perayu telah didapati bersalah dan disabitkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi, Kuala Lumpur, atas kesalahan bersama-sama melakukan perbuatan persediaan dengan niat bersama untuk mengedar dadah berbahaya, suatu kesalahan di bawah s 39B(1)(c) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) dibaca bersama s 34 Kanun Keseksaan (KK). Pertuduhan dalam kes ini telah dipinda daripada s 39B(1)(a) ADB kepada s 39B(1)(c) ADB. Hukuman mati mandatori telah dijatuhkan ke atas mereka mengikut peruntukan s 39B(2) ADB. Fakta kes menunjukkan penangkapan perayu yang pertama (T1) dan kedua (T2) adalah hasil suatu operasi ‘sting’ yang dilaksanakan oleh pasukan polis. Peguamcara-peguamcara perayu menghujahkan, antara lain (i) pendakwaan perlu membuktikan secara khusus pada tarikh dan waktu yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan apakah perbuatan persediaan mengedar dadah yang dilakukan oleh T1. Paling tinggi T1 hanya mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas dadah tersebut yang mana dengan anggapan di bawah s 37(d) ADB boleh membuktikan pemilikannya oleh T1. Tetapi untuk membuktikan T1 mengedar dadah itu, pendakwa perlu menggunakan anggapan s 37(da) ADB yang bergantung kepada berat dadah yang dimiliki; (ii) kelemahan keterangan ahli kimia (SP6) yang tidak menyatakan peratusan sampel yang diambil untuk analisis dan halangan anggapan berganda, T1 tidak boleh dianggap mengedar; (iii) ketiadaan izin dan rekuisisi Pendakwa Raya bagi pendakwaan atas pertuduhan yang dipinda (lihat P22) maka perbicaraan yang dijalankan itu tidak sah dan sabitannya terbatal. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya berhujah bahawa kesalahan melakukan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah adalah kesalahan yang berterusan yang merangkumi perbincangan dan penghantaran kepada pembeli. Perbuatan membawa dadah pada pukul 9.45 malam itu merupakan sebahagian daripada perbuatan mengedar. Katanya perbincangan antara Ketua Inspektor Amir Hamzah (SP10) (yang bertindak sebagai pembeli dadah), T1 dan T2 di dalam kereta pada malam itu diikuti dengan T1 keluar daripada kereta dan kemudian kembali semula membawa beg berisi dadah untuk diserahkan kepada SP10 sememangnya merupakan perbuatan-perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah itu.

6 MLJ 197 at 198

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut dan mengekalkan sabitan serta hukuman:

  • (1)
    Perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah meliputi berbagai perbuatan yang berterusan. Ia bermula dari saat persetujuan dicapai untuk mengedar dadah itu dan merangkumi apa jua perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh satu pihak untuk melaksanakan tujuan tersebut dan termasuk mendapatkan bekalannya, pembungkusan, penghantaran dan pertemuan antara pihak, jika perlu, sehinggalah ia berjaya diserahkan kepada pihak lain. Dalam konteks kes ini, pengedaran yang dimaksudkan ialah penjualan dadah ganja atau kanabis kepada atau pembeliannya oleh SP10. Apa yang berlaku pada pukul 9.45 malam itu adalah babak terakhir dalam persediaan untuk mengedar dadah itu. Ia berupa pembekalan dan penghantaran 3kg ganja oleh T1 bagi maksud penyerahan bersama oleh T1 dan T2 kepada SP10 seperti dijanjikan sebelumnya untuk mendapatkan harga jualan yang dipersetujui (lihat perenggan 20).
  • (2)
    Kes perayu-perayu hadapi tidak bergantung kepada pemilikan atau anggapan mengedar di bawah s 37(da) ADB tetapi berasaskan keterangan langsung perbuatan yang dituduh. Pendakwa hanya perlu membuktikan bahawa beg yang dirampas itu mengandungi dadah berbahaya tak kira berapa beratnya. Jenis dan berat dadah hanya relevan bagi mengenalpasti identiti serta berat sebenar dadah berbahaya yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. Bagi maksud itu, Mahkamah perbicaraan seperti juga Mahkamah ini seharusnya mengambil pendekatan yang disarankan oleh Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (diikut) yang diikuti dalam kes PP v Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426 (diikut) dalam menangani keterangan daripada ahli kimia. Panduan pertama yang ditetapkan dalam kes-kes itu ialah supaya mahkamah perbicaraan menerima prima facie keterangan ahli kimia melainkan ia ternyata sukar dipercayai hingga tiada orang yang berfikiran waras boleh percaya kebenarannya. Keduanya, selagi keterangan itu boleh dipercayai ahli kimia tidak perlu menunjukkan secara terperinci apa yang dibuat di dalam makmalnya (lihat perenggan 24–25).
  • (3)
    Kes PP v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 (tidak diikut) silap menyamakan kedudukan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dengan pegawai yang diberi kuasa mendakwa. Pegawai polis yang menjalankan pendakwaan dalam kes Lim Seo v PP [1962] MLJ 304 (dibeza) mempunyai kuasa yang terhad kepada kuasa yang diberi, oleh itu tidak boleh bertindak di luar batasan itu. Ini berbeza dengan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang mengikut s 376(iii) Kanun Prosidur Jenayah boleh menjalankan semua kuasa Pendakwa Raya selain kuasa tertentu (tidak berkaitan di sini) yang perlu dijalankan sendiri oleh Pendakwa Raya. Apabila Timbalan Pendakwa Raya sendiri yang menjalankan pendakwaan seperti di sini, persetujuannya adalah tersirat dalam tindakannya itu (lihat perenggan 30); PP v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155 (diikut) diikut.

The appellants were charged and found guilty by the High Court, Kuala Lumpur, for a joint offence committed in preparation with a common intention to trafficking dangerous drugs, an offence under s 39B(1)(c)Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (DDA)

6 MLJ 197 at 199

read together with s 34 of the Penal Code (PC). The charges in this case was amended from s 39B(1)(a)DDA to s 39B(1)(c)DDA. The mandatory death sentence was passed on them in accordance to the provision of s 39B(2)DDA. The facts of the case showed that the arrest of the first appellant (T1) and the second (T2) was the result of a sting operation by the police force. The lawyers for the appellants submitted, inter alia: (i) the prosecution needs to prove specifically that at the date and time stated in the charge what was the preparatory act in trafficking of the drugs committed by T1. At most T1 only had custody and control of the drugs where pursuant to the presumption under s 37(d) DDA, it establishes possession by T1. However to prove trafficking by T1, the prosecution needs to use the presumption under s 37(da)DDA which relies on the weight of the drugs possessed; (ii) the weaknesses in the chemist’s evidence (SP6) in failing to state the percentage of the sample taken for analysis and the restriction in double presumption, T1 cannot be presumed to be trafficking; (iii) there was no consent and requisition by the public prosecutor for the prosecution and charges to be amended, hence the trial conducted is not valid and the conviction void. The deputy public prosecutor submitted that the offence of preparation for trafficking drugs is a continuing offence involving negotiation and delivery of the drugs to the puchaser. The act of carrying the drugs at 9.45pm is part of the act of trafficking. He further submitted that the discussion between Chief Inspector Amir Hamzah (SP10) (who acted as a purchaser), T1 and T2 in the car on that night followed by T1 getting out of the car and then returning again with a bag containing drugs to be handed over to SP10 are acts in preparation to trafficking.

Held, dismissing the appeal and affirming the conviction and sentence:

  • (1)
    The preparatory act for the purpose of trafficking drugs covers a number of continuing acts. It started from the second an agreement was reached to traffick the said drugs and it covers whatever action done by a party to carry out the said purpose and would include getting the supply, wrapping, sending and meeting between the parties, if necessary until they succeeded in handing it over to another party. In the context of this case, the trafficking meant is the sale of ganja or cannabis or the purchase of it by SP10. What occurred at 9.45pm is the final chapter in the preparation to trafficking the drugs. It constitutes the supply and delivery of 3kg of ganja by T1 for the purpose of T1 and T2 jointly handing it over to SP10 as was agreed beforehand to obtain the sum agreed upon (see para 20).
  • (2)
    The appellants’ case is not on possession or presumption of trafficking pursuant to s 37(da) DDA but is based on direct evidence of the acts of the accused. The prosecution only needs to prove that the bag seized contained dangerous drugs regardless of its weight. The type and weight of the drugs is only relevant to ensure the identity and the exact weight of the dangerous drugs as stated in the charge. For that reason, the trial court just like this court, should use the approach recommended by the Supreme Court in the case of Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 followed in the case of PP v Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426to deal with the evidence of the chemist. The first guide established in those cases is that unless the evidence is so inherently incredible that no reasonable person can believe it to be true, the trial court should accept

    6 MLJ 197 at 200

    it as prima facie evidence. As long as the evidence is credible, there is no necessity for the chemist to show in detail what he did in his laboratory (see para 24–25).

  • (3)
    The case of PP v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 was wrong in equating the position of the Deputy Public Prosecutor with the officer who is given the power to prosecute. The police officer who prosecuted in the case of Lim Seo v PP [1962] MLJ 304 had limited power, hence he was unable to act beyond that, vested unlike a Deputy Public Prosecutor who in accordance with s 376(iii)Criminal Procedure Code may exercise all of the powers vested in the Public Prosecutor except certain powers (inapplicable here) exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally. When it is the Deputy Public Prosecutor who personally conduct the prosecution as in this case, the consent of the Public Prosecutor was implicit (see para 30); PP v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155 followed.
Nota-nota

Untuk kes-kes mengenai pengedaran dadah berbahaya, lihat 4 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) perenggan 112–123.

Untuk kes-kes mengenai pindaan pertuduhan, lihat 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) perenggan 994–996.

Kes-kes yang dirujuk

Abdul Hamid v PP [1956] MLJ 231 (dirujuk)

Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 301 (dirujuk)

Chin Hon & 2 Ors v PP [1948] MLJ 193 (dirujuk)

Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v PP [2004] 4 MLJ 489 (dirujuk)

Leong Bon Huat v PP [1993] 3 MLJ 11 (dirujuk)

Lim Guan Eng v PP [2000] 2 MLJ 877 (dirujuk)

Lim Seo v PP [1962] MLJ 304

Loo Kia Meng v PP [2000] 3 MLJ 446 (dirujuk)

Lyn Hong Yap v PP [1956] MLJ 226 (dirujuk)

Mohamad Hassan v PP [1998] 2 MLJ 273 (dirujuk)

Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492

PP v Chow Kam Meng [2001] 7 CLJ 387 (dirujuk)

PP v Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426

PP v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45

PP v Mansor bin Md Rashid [1996] 3 AMR 3989 (dirujuk)

PP v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155

PP v Muhamad Nasir bin Shaharuddin & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 576 (dirujuk)

Roslim bin Harun v PP [1994] 2 MLJ 132 (dirujuk)

Sabarudin bin Non & Ors v PP [2005] 4 MLJ 37 (dirujuk)

Shariff bin Kadir v PP [2003] 2 MLJ 203 (distd)

Tan Cheng Kooi & Anor v PP [1972] 2 MLJ 115 (dirujuk)

Ti Chwee Hiang v PP [1995] 2 MLJ 433 (dirujuk)

Undang-undang yang dirujuk

Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 ss 2, 37(d), 37(da), s 37(j), 39A(2), 39B(2), 39B(1)(b), 39B(1)(c), 40, 40A

6 MLJ 197 at 201

Akta Keterangan 1950 ss 35, 114(g), 145, 157

Kanun Acara Jenayah s 376(iii)

Kanun Keseksaan ss 34, 379, 381

Rayuan daripada: Perbicaraan Jenayah Bil 45–10 tahun 1995 (Mahkamah Tinggi, Kuala Lumpur)

Collin Sequerah (Amir Hamzah with him) (Zain & Co) bagi pihak perayu pertama.
Gurbachan Singh (Bachan & Kartar) bagi pihak perayu kedua.
Kamarulzaman bin Abdul Jalil (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Jabatan Peguam Negara) bagi pihak responden.

Tengku Baharudin Shah HMR (menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah):

[1] Perayu-perayu telah didapati bersalah dan disabitkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi, Kuala Lumpur, atas kesalahan bersama-sama melakukan perbuatan persediaan dengan niat bersama untuk mengedar dadah berbahaya di Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur, pada 5 April 1996, jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam, suatu kesalahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 s 39B(1)(c) (ADB) dibaca bersama Kanun Keseksaan s 34 (KK). Hukuman mati mandatori telah dijatuhkan ke atas mereka mengikut peruntukan s39B(2) ADB. Mereka merayu ke mahkamah ini.

[2] Rayuan-rayuan mereka telah kami dengar. Hujah-hujah peguam-peguam mereka dan daripada pihak pendakwa telah diteliti dan dikaji dan semua keterangan dan kandungan rekod rayuan telah kami halusi sebelum kami dengan sebulat suara menolak rayuan mereka dan mengekalkan keputusan mahkamah perbicaraan itu. Berikut adalah alasan-alasan kami.

[3] Bagi maksud penghakiman ini, perayu dalam Rayuan Jenayah Bil W–05–53–97 yang merupakan tertuduh pertama dalam Perbicaraan Jenayah Bil 45–10–96 di Mahkamah Tinggi akan dirujuk sebagai T1 sementara perayu dalam Rayuan Jenayah Bil W–05–54–97 yang merupakan tertuduh kedua dalam kes yang sama akan dirujuk sebagai T2.

[4] Fakta kes menunjukkan penangkapan T1 dan T2 adalah hasil suatu operasi ‘sting’ yang dilaksanakan oleh pasukan polis daripada Unit Risikan Jenayah, Ibu Pejabat Polis Diraja, Bukit Aman. Ketua Inspektor Amir Hamzah (SP10) yang bertindak sebagai pembeli dadah telah diperkenalkan oleh sumbernya bernama ‘MUD’ kepada seorang lelaki yang dikenali sebagai ‘AGAM’ di sebuah restoran di Paya Jaras pada 4 April 1996. Setelah Mud disuruh beredar dan pergi dari situ, SP10 telah membuat tawaran kepada Agam untuk membeli dadah ganja sebanyak 10kg. Agam bersetuju untuk membekalkan dadah itu dengan harga RM1,600 sekilo. Agam memberitahu SP10 bahawa dadah itu disimpan di Kampung Baru dan hanya boleh diambil pada sebelah petang atau malam sedikit. Mereka terus berbual sehingga pukul 7.00 malam apabila Agam menyatakan kesediaannya untuk pergi.

6 MLJ 197 at 202

[5] SP10 menaiki dan memandu keretanya jenis Mitsubishi GTO berwarna merah dengan Agam duduk di sebelahnya menunjukkan arah. Selepas setengah jam perjalanan SP10 telah diarah berhenti di tepi jalan Jalan Cendana, Kampung Baru di mana SP10 disuruh tunggu sementara Agam keluar daripada kereta dan pergi dengan alasan untuk mengesahkan barang itu ada. Dia datang balik ke kereta 15–20 minit kemudian dan memberitahu SP10 bahawa barang belum ada dan mereka balik semula ke Paya Jaras.

[6] Dalam perjalanan balik, Agam menawarkan untuk mendapatkan barang itu dibawa ke Paya Jaras dengan bayaran tambahan RM300. SP10 tidak bersetuju. SP10 dengan itu diminta datang ke tempat sama pada pukul 3.00 petang esoknya.

[7] Esoknya pada 5 April 1996 pukul 11.30 pagi SP10 telah berada bersama 10 orang anggota polis di Bilik Gerakan, Pasukan Bertindak Jenayah Narkotik, di Cheras di mana beliau memberi taklimat berkaitan dengan cadangan pembelian dadah ganja di Kampung Baru itu dan perancangan dibuat untuk memberkas pembekalnya.

[8] Pada sebelah petangnya, SP10 telah berjumpa Agam seperti dijanji dan pada pukul 3.30 petang telah pergi bersamanya ke Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru dan berada di sana lebih kurang setengah jam. Sekali lagi SP10 gagal melihat barang yang dihajati. Agam diusir keluar daripada kereta SP10 dan diberikan nombor telefon bimbit dengan pesanan supaya menelefonnya kalau hendak berniaga dengannya tetapi dia mahu tengok barang dahulu. Agam berjanji akan menelefonnya malam itu. Di tahap itu SP10 beranggap yang dia hanya berurusan dengan Agam seorang.

[9] Pada malam itu, Agam telah menelefon SP10 sebanyak lima kali pada nombor yang diberikan tetapi SP10 hanya menjawab panggilan kelima. Agam memberitahu yang barang sudah ada dan minta SP10 pergi ke hadapan Klinik YULI di Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru. Pertemuan ditetapkan pada pukul 9.00 malam.

[10] Selepas taklimat akhir diadakan dengan anggotanya, SP10 telah menaiki kereta Mitsubishi merahnya pergi ke tempat yang dijanjikan dan memberhentikan keretanya di bawah cahaya lampu jalan, berdekatan pondok telefon awam. Anggota polis lain juga turut pergi dalam 2 kumpulan bermotosikal dan 2 kumpulan berkereta masing-masing mengambil tempat yang sesuai. Lebih kurang pukul 9.20 malam, Agam datang bersama seorang lelaki yang diperkenalkan kepada SP10 sebagai Tarmizi. SP10 suruh mereka masuk ke dalam kereta — Tarmizi duduk di depan dan Agam di belakang. Di dalam kereta, Tarmizi terus memberitahu SP10 yang dia ada ganja tapi tidak dapat 10 kilo, cuma 3 kilo sahaja. Apabila SP10 menyatakan persetujuan Tarmizi minta duitnya tetapi SP10 hanya menunjukkan duit yang dibawanya. Katanya dia ada duit untuk 10 kilo tapi minta Tarmizi tunjukkan barangnya dahulu baru akan memberikan duitnya. Kemudian Tarmizi keluar daripada kereta itu untuk mendapatkan barangnya.

[11] Ketika menunggu di dalam kereta, Agam menyatakan kali itu tidak dapat 10kg hanya 3kg dan lain kali dia akan uruskan lagi. Setelah menunggu selama 15–20 minit mereka nampak Tarmizi datang ke arah belakang kereta. Mereka keluar

6 MLJ 197 at 203

daripada kereta dan pergi ke arahnya. Tarmizi membawa satu beg galas yang dibuka di hadapan SP10 dan Agam mengeluarkan daripadanya satu bungkusan mampat berbalut plastik lutsinar untuk ditunjuk kepada SP10. SP10 mencium, tengok dan tekan bungkusan itu dan mengesyakinya ganja. Atas gesaan Tarmizi dan Agam supaya cepat, SP10 lantas pergi ke pintu kereta bahagian pemandu untuk mengambil duitnya tetapi sebaliknya telah membongkok dan menarik lever untuk membuka boot kereta. Tindakan SP10 itu merupakan isyarat kepada anggota-anggotanya untuk bertindak.[12] Apabila boot kereta terbuka dan SP10 nampak pasukan polis menerkam ke arah Tarmizi dan Agam, dia terus masuk semula ke keretanya, menghidupkan enjinnya dan beredar dari situ. Semasa memberi keterangannya, SP10 telah mengecam T1 sebagai Tarmizi dan T2 sebagai Agam.

[13] Chief Inspektor Fisol (SP5) yang bersama Det. Kpl Rosdi (SP8) membuat pemerhatian dari jarak 10-15 meter nampak apa yang berlaku di sekitar kereta SP10 malam itu dan telah mengecam T1 sebagai lelaki bertubuh tinggi lampai berpakaian kemeja-T berlengan panjang warna merah dan berseluar jeans gelap yang masuk ke dalam kereta merah SP10 bersama T2 yang berpakaian kemeja-T putih berseluar gelap. Katanya T1 telah cuba melarikan diri apabila diserbu polis. SP5 telah bergelut dengannya bila mana beg galas telah dibuang oleh T1 sebelum melepaskan dirinya. T1 juga berjaya melepaskan dirinya daripada Chief Inspektor Zambri yang menerpanya dan telah ditolak jatuh dan cedera. T1 kemudian dikejar oleh Det Kpl Khalid (SP7) yang berjaya menangkapnya setelah melepaskan dua tembakan dan mencederakan betis kanannya.

[14] T1 dan T2 turut dicam oleh SP7 dan SP8 daripada pakaian mereka sebagai dua orang lelaki yang ada bersama SP10 malam itu. T2 juga didakwa cuba melepaskan dirinya apabila diserbu tetapi berjaya ditangkap oleh SP8 dengan bantuan Det Sjn Abdullah.

[15] Di hadapan kami, peguam-peguam yang bijaksana bagi pihak kedua-dua perayu telah membangkitkan beberapa isu yang dikatakan telah menggugat sabitan-sabitan ke atas anakguam mereka masing-masing. Hujah-hujah mereka serta jawapan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang bijaksana dihuraikan berikutnya dan akan menjelaskan keputusan yang dibuat.

ELEMEN PENGEDARAN GAGAL DIBUKTIKAN

[16] Walaupun T1 telah mengemukakan Petisyen Rayuan Yang Dipinda mengandungi 21 alasan, En Collin Sequerah peguambela yang mewakilinya hanya mengutarakan dua perkara sahaja di hadapan kami. Pertama dihujahkan yang pendakwaan perlu membuktikan secara khusus pada tarikh dan waktu yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan apakah perbuatan persediaan mengedar dadah yang dilakukan oleh T1. Dengan perkataan ‘mengedar’ (trafficking) diberi takrif yang begitu luas dalam s 2 ADB dan perkataan ‘persediaan’ (preparatory) tidak ditakrif, perbuatan yang mana satukah yang dilakukan oleh T1 pada 5 April 1996 jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam di Jalan Raja Alang yang menjadi kesalahan? Katanya, mengikut

6 MLJ 197 at 204

keterangan SP10 dia sampai di tempat itu pada pukul 9.00 malam, T1 dan T2 datang ke keretanya pada pukul 9.20 malam, perbincangan mereka di dalam kereta tak mungkin mengambil masa lebih daripada lima minit dan dengan 15-20 minit lagi bagi T1 pergi meninggalkan kereta dan balik semula, apa yang berlaku pada pukul 9.45 malam hanyalah perbuatan membawa beg berisi dadah.[17] Hujahnya, paling tinggi T1 hanya mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas dadah tersebut yang mana dengan anggapan di bawah s 37(d) ADB boleh membuktikan pemilikannya oleh T1. Tetapi untuk membuktikan T1 mengedar dadah itu, pendakwa perlu menggunakan anggapan s 37(da) ADB yang bergantung kepada berat dadah yang dimiliki. Dihujahkan dengan kelemahan keterangan ahli kimia (SP6) yang tidak menyatakan peratusan sampel yang diambil untuk analisis dan halangan anggapan berganda seperti dijelaskan dalam kes Mohamad Hassan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273, T1 tidak boleh dianggap mengedar.

[18] Encik Gurbachan Singh yang mewakili T2 menerima pakai hujah yang sama untuk anakguamnya bagi mengelak daripada mengulanginya.

[19] TPR En. Kamarulzaman Abdul Jalil berhujah bahawa kesalahan melakukan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah adalah kesalahan yang berterusan yang merangkumi perbincangan dan penghantaran kepada pembeli. Perbuatan membawa dadah pada pukul 9.45 malam itu merupakan sebahagian daripada perbuatan mengedar. Katanya perbincangan antara SP10, T1 dan T2 di dalam kereta pada malam itu diikuti dengan T1 keluar daripada kereta dan kemudian kembali semula membawa beg berisi dadah untuk diserahkan kepada SP10 sememangnya merupakan perbuatan-perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah itu.

[20] Kami bersetuju dengan saranan TPR bahawa perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah meliputi berbagai perbuatan yang berterusan. Ia bermula dari saat persetujuan dicapai untuk mengedar dadah itu dan merangkumi apa jua perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh satu pihak untuk melaksanakan tujuan tersebut dan termasuk mendapatkan bekalannya, pembungkusan, penghantaran dan pertemuan antara pihak, jika perlu, sehinggalah ia berjaya diserahkan kepada pihak lain. Dalam konteks kes ini, pengedaran yang dimaksudkan ialah penjualan dadah ganja atau cannabis kepada atau pembeliannya oleh SP10. Apa yang berlaku pada pukul 9.45 malam itu adalah babak terakhir dalam persediaan untuk mengedar dadah itu. Ia berupa pembekalan dan penghantaran 3kg ganja oleh T1 bagi maksud penyerahan bersama oleh T1 dan T2 kepada SP10 seperti dijanjikan sebelumnya untuk mendapatkan harga jualan yang dipersetujui.

[21] Perlu ditegaskan bahawa keterangan SP10 mengenai persetujuan yang dicapai di Paya Jaras pada 4 April 1996 di mana T2 bersetuju untuk membekalkan 10 kilo ganja kepada SP10 dengan harga RM1,600 sekilo tidak dicabar oleh T2 dalam pemeriksaan balas mahupun dinafikan dalam kenyataan pembelaan T2 sendiri. T2 juga tidak mempertikaikan tindakan membawa SP10 ke Kampung Baru pada 4 dan 5 April 1996 bagi cuba meyakinkan SP10 atas keupayaannya mendapatkan dadah itu. Persetujuan T1 dan T2 untuk membekalkan hanya 3kg ganja sahaja kepada SP10 pada harga yang dipersetujui pada malam 5hb April 1996 disusuli dengan T1

6 MLJ 197 at 205

mendapatkan bekalan dadah itu dan penyerahannya yang hampir terlaksana juga tidak dipertikai atau dicabar oleh kedua-dua T1 dan T2. Dalam semua hal keadaan sedemikian kemusykilan yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak perayu itu ternyata tidak bermerit dan ditolak.

KELEMAHAN KETERANGAN AHLI KIMIA

[22] Encik Sequerah kemudian mempertikai kegagalan SP6 menyatakan peratusan sampel yang dianalisis tidak menepati kehendak 10% yang ditetapkan di bawah s 37(j)ADB. Beliau berhujah dengan kegagalan itu pendakwa perlu membuktikan semua bahan yang dirampas itu dianalisis dan dibuktikan adalah cannabis, jika tidak T1 hanya boleh disabitkan atas kesalahan memiliki cannabis di bawah s 39A(2). Kes-kes Leong Bon Huat v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 MLJ 11 dan Loo Kia Meng v Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 MLJ 446 dirujuk sebagai sokongan. Encik Gurbachan Singh pula menambah bahawa keputusan kes Loo Kia Meng telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan sementara kes Leong Bon Huat walaupun telah dibezakan dari segi fakta tidak pernah ditolak keputusannya. Juga dihujahkan bahawa pemeriksaan penglihatan dan secara microskop sahaja tidak mencukupi untuk menentukan tanpa keraguan yang bahan itu cannabis.

[23] Kes Mahkamah Agong Roslim bin Harun v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 MLJ 132 telah dirujuk oleh TPR sebagai jawapan. Dalam kes itu, Edgar Joseph Jr HMA yang juga hakim yang menulis penghakiman dalam kes Leong Bon Huat telah membezakan kes itu dengan kes di mana tiada kelemahan terdapat dalam keterangan ahli kimia dan Mahkamah tidak ragu-ragu memutuskan bahan yang dianalisis adalah cannabis. Dirujuk juga kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2004] 4 MLJ 489 di mana kedua-dua penghakiman majoriti dan minoriti bersetuju bahawa Mahkamah Agong dalam Leong Bon Huat tidak menetapkan sebarang kaedah bahawa 10% daripada berat keseluruhan dadah yang dirampas mestilah diambil sebagai sampel untuk tujuan penganalisisan. Bahkan s 37(j) ADB hanya memperuntukkan di mana dadah yang dirampas terkandung di dalam banyak bekas, maka adalah mencukupi jika dianalisis sampel kandungan 10% daripada bekas-bekas itu.

[24] Pada pendapat kami, kes Leong Bon Huat atau Loo Kia Meng tidak, dalam apa cara jua pun, boleh membantu perayu-perayu dalam rayuan ini, kerana kes yang mereka hadapi tidak bergantung kepada pemilikan atau anggapan mengedar di bawah s 37(da) ADB tetapi berasaskan keterangan langsung perbuatan yang dituduh. Pendakwa hanya perlu membuktikan bahawa beg yang dirampas itu mengandungi dadah berbahaya tak kira berapa beratnya. Jenis dan berat dadah hanya relevan bagi mengenalpasti identiti serta berat sebenar dadah berbahaya yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. Bagi maksud itu, mahkamah perbicaraan seperti juga mahkamah ini seharusnya mengambil pendekatan yang disarankan oleh Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 yang diikuti dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426 dalam menangani keterangan daripada ahli kimia.

6 MLJ 197 at 206

[25] Panduan pertama yang ditetapkan dalam kes-kes itu ialah supaya mahkamah perbicaraan menerima prima facie keterangan ahli kimia melainkan ia ternyata sukar dipercayai hingga tiada orang yang berfikiran waras boleh percaya kebenarannya. Keduanya, selagi keterangan itu boleh dipercayai ahli kimia tidak perlu menunjukkan secara terperinci apa yang dibuat di dalam makmalnya. Atas dasar itu, hujah mengenai kelemahan keterangan SP6 adalah meleset. Sebaliknya jika diteliti keterangannya, SP6 (lihat ms 44 Rekod Rayuan) jelas menyatakan bahawa dia telah membuat pemeriksaan fisikal dan mikroskopik ke atas semua bahan tumbuhan yang diterima dan mendapati kesemuanya daripada genus cannabis dan ujian DLT dan TLC yang dijalankan ke atas 32 sampel rawak yang diambilnya mengesahkan bahan tumbuhan itu adalah cannabis seperti yang ditakrif dalam s 2 ADB. Dengan kata lain 100% bahan yang dirampas dan dianalisis dibuktikan adalah cannabis. Oleh itu tidak ada asas bagi Mahkamah perbicaraan menolak keterangannya — lihat Roslim bin Harun.

[26] Pada pendapat kami, Yang Arif Hakim perbicaraan telah membuat pertimbangan yang betul dan mencapai penemuan fakta yang tepat apabila menilai keterangan SP6 seperti berikut:

Dalam kes semasa mahkamah menerima keterangan SP6 yang menerangkan bagaimana dan apakah ujian-ujian yang dibuat oleh beliau itu membolehkannya membuat kesimpulan bahawa kesemua bahan-bahan mampat itu P6, P7 dan P8 adalah cannabis seperti yang ditafsirkan di bawah s 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta).

Cara SP6 mengambil timbangan berat cannabis berkenaan juga tidak dicabar oleh Peguambela semasa pemeriksaan-balas. Oleh itu Mahkamah menerima keterangan SP6 bahawa bahan mampat yang diperolehi daripada beg yang dibawa oleh tertuduh pertama itu adalah cannabis seperti yang ditafsirkan oleh s 2 Akta, berjumlah seberat 2996.4g. Mahkamah tidak mendapati apa-apa kecacatan di dalam keterangan SP6 seperti yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Roslim bin Harun v PP [1994] 2 MLJ 132 :

Diputuskan: menolak rayuan itu:

Leong Boon Huat v PP boleh dibezakan kerana di dalam kes ini, tidak terdapat kecacatan di dalam keterangan Ahli Kimia seperti yang terdapat di dalam kes Leong Boon Huat. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak teragak-agak untuk membuat keputusan bahawa perkara dakwaan itu adalah ganja mengikut maksud s 2 Akta itu.

Kami juga dapati daripada nota keterangan (lihat ms 48 Rekod Rayuan) bahawa keterangan SP6 tidak langsung dipertikai atau dicabar sama ada melalui pemeriksaan balas atau keterangan lain. Oleh itu, tiada asas untuk meragui kebenarannya.

KETIADAAN IZIN DAN REKUISISI PENDAKWA RAYA BAGI PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN

[27] Encik Gurbachan Singh bagi pihak T2 kemudian membangkitkan isu izin dan rekuisisi Pendakwa Raya (P1) yang dikatakan adalah untuk pendakwaan T1 dan T2 bagi kesalahan di bawah s 39B(1)(a) ADB sedangkan pertuduhan telah dipinda kepada kesalahan di bawah s 39B(1)(c) ADB yang perayu-perayu disabitkan. Dihujahkan dengan ketiadaan izin dan rekuisisi Pendakwa Raya bagi pendakwaan atas pertuduhan yang dipinda (lihat P22) maka perbicaraan yang dijalankan itu tidak

6 MLJ 197 at 207

sah dan sabitannya terbatal. Dihujahkan walaupun diakui P1 ditandatangani oleh seorang TPR dan itu tidak salah tetapi pada hakikatnya tiada izin dan rekuisisi dikeluarkan bagi pendakwaan atas pertuduhan pindaan P22 walaupun pendakwaan itu dijalankan sendiri oleh seorang TPR. Kes Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45dirujuk sebagai sokongan.[28] Seperti juga kes Lee Chwee Kiok pertuduhan dalam kes kita dipinda daripada s 39B(1)(a) ADB kepada s 39B(1)(c) ADB. Di situ Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan berasaskan Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 231, Lim Seo v PP [1962] MLJ 304 dan Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226 bahawa perbicaraan itu batal kerana Pendakwa Raya tidak memberikan izinnya bagi pertuduhan pindaan. Jika diteliti kes Abdul Hamid memutuskan bahawa izin mendakwa ‘is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side’, sedangkan dalam kes Lim Seo diputuskan bahawa pendakwa yang diberi izin mendakwa bagi kesalahan Kanun Keseksaan s 379 tidak boleh lari daripada kuasa yang diberi kepadanya secara khusus dan meminda pertuduhan kepada kesalahan Kanun Keseksaan s 381 dan kes Lyn Hong Yap pula hanya memutuskan bahawa perbicaraan adalah batal jika Pendakwa Raya tiada memberikan sanksi di mana sanksi diperlukan bagi pendakwaan.

[29] Dalam kes PP v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155 yang dirujuk oleh TPR yang bijaksana kes Lee Chwee Kiok telah dirujuk tetapi tidak diikuti. Di situ telah diputuskan bahawa TPR sebagai pendakwa dalam kes itu merupakan alter ego kepada Pendakwa Raya dan perbicaraan atas pertuduhan pindaan tanpa izin berasingan daripada Pendakwa Raya dibenarkan.

[30] Pada hemat kami, Lee Chwee Kiok silap menyamakan kedudukan TPR dengan pegawai yang diberi kuasa mendakwa. pegawai polis yang menjalankan pendakwaan dalam kes Lim Seo mempunyai kuasa yang terhad kepada kuasa yang diberi, oleh itu tidak boleh bertindak di luar batasan itu. Ini berbeza dengan TPR yang mengikut Kanun Acara Jenayah s 376(iii) boleh menjalankan semua kuasa Pendakwa Raya selain kuasa tertentu (tidak berkaitan di sini) yang perlu dijalankan sendiri oleh Pendakwa Raya. Apabila TPR sendiri yang menjalankan pendakwaan seperti di sini, persetujuannya adalah tersirat dalam tindakannya itu. Atas dasar itu, keputusan kes Mohamed Halipah yang menerangkan kedudukan sebenar dari segi undang-undang adalah lebih tepat dan wajar diikuti.

[31] Tambahan pula dalam kes ini, izin dan rekuisisi (P1) ditandatangani oleh seorang TPR dan ini diakui tidak salah. Oleh itu adalah sukar diterima akal jika TPR yang menjalankan pendakwaan diperlukan mendapatkan izin daripada TPR lain pula untuk meminda pertuduhan dalam kes yang sedang dijalankan. Perbuatan meminda pertuduhan itu sendiri membayangkan pertimbangan dan penelitian yang telah dibuat sebelumnya dan menepati kehendak kes Abdul Hamid. Lagi pun pertuduhan pindaan P22 dibuat setelah pihak pendakwa selesai mengemukakan kesnya dan sebelum kes ditutup (lihat ms 86–87 Rekod Rayuan) dengan itu semua fakta kes pendakwa telah diketahui sepenuhnya. Juga pindaan yang dibuat adalah di bawah seksyen yang sama dan membawa hukuman yang sama, cuma perbuatan mengedar

6 MLJ 197 at 208

dalam pertuduhan asal belum sempat disempurnakan dengan bayaran dan penyerahan oleh itu pertuduhan dipinda kepada persediaan untuk mengedar seperti dalam P22 yang difikirkan lebih tepat dengan fakta yang telah dibuktikan. Hujah perayu dengan itu gagal.

KEGAGALAN MEMANGGIL ATAU MENAWARKAN PEMBERI MAKLUMAT SEBAGAI SAKSI

[32] Sebagai alasan berikutnya, En. Gurbachan Singh menghujahkan kegagalan pendakwa memanggil pemberi maklumat (Mud) sebagai saksi atau menawarkannya kepada pihak pembelaan telah menjejas kes pendakwa. Katanya Mud sebagai orang yang menemukan T2 dengan SP10 patut dipanggil memberi keterangan untuk melengkapkan pengisahan kes pendakwa. Tanpa keterangannya kes pendakwa dikatakan gagal dibukti. Kes Ti Chwee Hiang v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 MLJ 433 dijadikan sandaran.

[33] Fakta kes itu sebenarnya berbeza dengan kes kita dari segi peranan yang dimainkan pemberi maklumat masing-masing. Di sini peranan, Mud hanya mengenalkan T2 dengan SP10 di Paya Jaras pada 4 April 1996 sedangkan pertuduhan membabitkan peristiwa yang berlaku pada malam esoknya di tempat lain dan orang lain pula yang membekalkan dadah sabjek pertuduhan. Keterangan Mud tidak perlu untuk membuktikan kes pendakwa mau pun mempertikaikan apa yang terjadi pada hari dan waktu yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. Pemberi maklumat dalam Ti Chwee Hiang ternyata berperanan lebih aktif kerana dia telah bertindak sebagai agen provokatur yang mengaturkan supaya perayu bertemu dengan polis dan secara aktif menyebabkan perayu ditangkap, dengan itu dia telah hilang perlindungan yang diberi kepada pemberi maklumat di bawah s 40 ADB.

[34] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Mansor bin Md Rashid [1996] 3 AMR 3989 telah memutuskan bahawa pemberi maklumat dalam kes itu (Cholan) bukan seorang agen provokatur walaupun peranan yang dimainkan olehnya adalah lebih banyak daripada Mud dalam kes kita. Cholan di situ bukan sahaja mengenalkan PW9 (polis) kepada perayu tetapi turut hadir semasa dua transaksi berikutnya yang melibatkan penjualan 1 kati dan 1 kilo cannabis walaupun tiada keterangan yang dia membuat apa-apa selain hadir. Berpandukan perbandingan fakta kes-kes yang dirujuk, peranan Mud tidak lebih daripada pemberi maklumat dan bukanlah seorang saksi yang keterangannya diperlukan untuk membuktikan atau melengkapkan pengisahan kes pendakwa atas pertuduhan mengedar dadah atau melakukan perbuatan persediaan untuk berbuat demikian. Bahkan dia tiada peranan dalam peristiwa yang berlaku pada tarikh dan waktu dalam pertuduhan terhadap perayu-perayu.

KEGAGALAN MENGEMUKAKAN LAPORAN POLIS

[35] Bersandarkan kes Tan Cheng Kooi & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1972] 2 MLJ 115, peguambela yang bijaksana seterusnya cuba membangkitkan andaian yang memudaratkan di bawah Akta Keterangan 1950 s 114(g) (AK) atas kegagalan pihak pendakwa mengemukakan Laporan Polis Dang Wangi No 7049/96. Laporan ini

6 MLJ 197 at 209

dibuat oleh SP5 pada malam kejadian iaitu setelah T1 dan T2 ditangkap dan dibawa bersama barang-barang kes ke Balai Polis dan selepas selesai membuat tanda ke atas barang-barang kes tersebut (lihat ms 34–35 Rekod Rayuan). Peguam menghujahkan bahawa laporan itu walaupun di buat selepas tangkapan merupakan laporan maklumat pertama dan boleh diterima sebagai keterangan di bawah s 35 s 35 AK (lihat Public Prosecutor v Chow Kam Meng [2001] 7 CLJ 387).[36] Kami tidak bercadang untuk mengupas isu ini kerana peguam sendiri mengetahui jawapannya tidak memihak kepada anakguamnya. Beliau sendiri telah mengemukakan hujah yang sama di mahkamah tertinggi negara dalam kes Balachandran v Public Prosecutor (belum dilaporkan semasa rayuan didengar) yang dirujuk oleh TPR dan yang diputuskan tidak lama sebelum rayuan ini didengar. Laporannya kini terdapat dalam [2005] 2 MLJ 301. Dalam kes itu Mahkamah Persekutuan setelah meneliti nas-nas serta undang-undang berkaitan dan telah merumuskan secara ringkas seperti berikut:

The corollary is that an adverse inference cannot be drawn against the prosecution for failure to tender in evidence a first information report and the strength of its case is to be assessed as it stands.

[37] Apa pun jua, keterangan SP10 dari segi undang-undang tidak memerlukan keterangan sokongan (lihat s 40A ADB), sebaliknya di sini keterangannya disokong oleh keterangan saksi-saksi polis SP5, SP7 dan SP8 yang merupakan sebahagian daripada anggota bertindak polis yang menjalankan operasi yang sama pada malam itu.

[38] Anda perlu menerima hakikat bahawa keterangan laporan maklumat pertama bukanlah suatu keterangan substantif dan ia tidak boleh diterima bagi tujuan membuktikan keterangan fakta yang dinyatakan di dalamnya. Ia hanya boleh digunakan bagi menyokong keterangan lain seperti dibenarkan oleh seksyen 157 AK atau mencabar keterangan itu seperti diperuntukkan oleh s 145 AK (lihat Tan Cheng Kooi di ms 118 dan Lim Guan Eng v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 MLJ 877). Dalam kes ini kebenaran keterangan SP10 tentang apa yang berlaku antaranya dengan T1 dan T2 tidak pernah dipertikai. Ia tidak juga dicabar dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh perayu-perayu. Dan tiada cubaan dibuat untuk mencabar kredibiliti SP10 dengan menggunakan laporan maklumat pertama itu. Oleh itu kegagalan pendakwa mengemukakan laporan polis itu tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan.

TUDUHAN BERSAMA-SAMA DAN NIAT BERSAMA

[39] Hujahan selanjut En Gurbachan Singh ialah mengenai pertuduhan yang dikatakan gagal dibuktikan terhadap T2. Mulanya dihujahkan bahawa pertuduhan melibatkan tindakan bersama dan niat bersama tetapi Yang Arif Hakim perbicaraan tidak langsung menimbang perkara itu dan ini merupakan satu salah arah dalam bentuk tanpa arah. Ini nyata tidak benar kerana dalam penghakimannya Yang Arif itu telah dengan panjang lebar menjelaskan sebab beliau membuat penemuan fakta bahawa T1 dan T2 mempunyai niat bersama untuk melakukan kesalahan yang mereka bersama dituduh. Di ms 137 Rekod Rayuan Yang Arif ada menyatakan:

6 MLJ 197 at 210

Keterangan SP10 seorang agen provokasi menyatakan dia telah berbincang dengan Tertuduh Kedua pada 4 April 1996 untuk membeli 10kg ganja dengan hanya (harga?) RM1,600 sekilo. Apabila gagal mendapat bekalan pada 4 April 1996 Tertuduh Kedua dan SP10 bersetuju untuk berjumpa kembali pada keesokan harinya iaitu 5 April 1996 bagi tujuan mendapat ganja itu. Pada 5 April 1996 seperti yang dijanjikan itu di tempat dan masa seperti di dalam pertuduhan (P22), Tertuduh Kedua membawa Tertuduh Pertama dan mereka berbincang lagi dengan SP10 di dalam keretanya. Kemudian Tertuduh Pertama keluar daripada kereta SP10 selama lebih kurang 15-20 minit apabila Tertuduh Pertama kembali membawa lebih kurang 3kg ganja. Daripada keterangan itu Mahkamah berpendapat jelas kedua-dua Tertuduh telah mempunyai niat bersama untuk menjual dadah kepada SP10.

Ini diikuti pula dengan petikan kata daripada Pretheroe Ag CJ dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Chin Hon & 2 Ors v Public Prosecutor [1948] MLJ 193, ms 194 untuk menguatkan keputusannya seperti berikut:

In this appeal there was abundant evidence to prove that the three appellants had made a prearranged plan and that this plan was duly carried out as prearranged. Apart from this, the three appellants were all present when the act was carried out, and there was evidence which the Assessors could have accepted to prove each appellant took an active part in the murder.

[40] Keduanya, peguam yang bijaksana berhujah bahawa pendakwaan perlu membuktikan pemilikan bersama dadah itu oleh T1 dan T2 kerana pertuduhan menyebut ‘bahawa kamu bersama-sama … dalam mencapai niat bersama …’ melakukan kesalahan itu. Kes Public Prosecutor v Muhamad Nasir bin Shaharuddin [1994] 2 MLJ 576 dirujuk sebagai authoriti. Dalam kes itu, si isteri yang dengan suaminya dituduh bersama-sama mengedar dadah berbahaya yang dijumpai di rumah mereka dibebas dan dilepaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil kerana pendakwa gagal membuktikan dadah itu berada dalam miliknya. Dengan hormatnya, kami bersetuju dengan hujah TPR yang bijaksana bahawa dalam kes itu niat bersama di bawah s 34 KK tidak dimasukkan, oleh itu setiap orang tertuduh perlu dibuktikan memiliki dadah berkenaan. Ini berbeza dengan kes kita di mana pertuduhannya bukan sahaja turut merujuk kepada niat bersama dan s 34 (lihat pertuduhan P22) tetapi juga pembuktian kesalahannya tidak bergantung kepada bukti pemilikan oleh mana-mana perayu. Pendakwaan di sini tidak perlu membuktikan kedua-dua mereka melakukan kesalahan itu, tetapi memadai dengan membuktikan wujudnya niat bersama antara keduanya untuk mengedar dadah itu dan dengan itu menjadikan mereka sama-sama bersalah. Dalam kes yang dirujuk itu sendiri diakui bahawa dalam kes-kes niat bersama pendakwa hanya perlu membuktikan seorang daripada tertuduh melakukan perbuatan itu sedangkan yang lain hanya mengambil bahagian di dalamnya dalam mencapai niat bersama mereka.

[41] Apa pun jua, perkataan ‘bersama-sama’ di awal pertuduhan tersendiri mungkin boleh disalah erti, tetapi apabila dibaca bersama perkataan-perkataan ‘dalam mencapai niat bersama’ dan ‘dibaca bersama s 34’ yang berikutannya tidak timbul keraguan bahawa pertuduhan yang dihadapi adalah pertuduhan yang berlandaskan premis niat tersebut dan bukan pertuduhan bersama dalam erti kata ‘joint charge’.

6 MLJ 197 at 211

[42] Mahkamah ini dalam kes Sabarudin bin Non & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2005] 4 MLJ 37 telah menerangkan prinsip-prinsip tentang pembuktian niat bersama. Dasar tanggungan di bawah peruntukan s 34 KK itu boleh didapati pada kewujudan niat bersama dalam diri tertuduh yang mendorong kepada berlakunya perbuatan jenayah bagi mencapai niat bersama itu. Akibat daripada pemakaian prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam s 34 itu ialah apabila seorang tertuduh disabitkan di bawah s 302 dibaca bersama s 34, dari segi undang-undang ia bermakna tertuduh itu bertanggungan bagi perbuatan yang dilakukan olehnya yang menyebabkan kematian itu sama seperti jika ia dilakukan olehnya seorang. Seksyen itu memberi pengiktirafan kepada prinsip akal (common sense) bahawa jika lebih daripada seorang dengan niat atau perancangan yang satu bersama-sama melakukan sesuatu tindakan bagi mencapai hasrat itu ia samalah seperti jika masing-masing telah melakukannya sendiri perbuatan yang dirancang itu. Ujian utamanya adalah perancangan sedemikian hendaklah mendahului tindakan yang membentuk suatu kesalahan. Dan ini mungkin timbul sebelum atau semasa berlakunya perlakuan kesalahan itu.

[43] Fakta kes ini menunjukkan perancangan untuk menjual dadah kepada SP10 telah wujud sebelum T2 menemukan SP10 dengan pembekalnya T1 pada malam kejadian. Maka dengan itu T2 pasti telah menghubungi T1 dan mendapat persetujuannya sebelum menetapkan tempat dan masa temujanji dengan SP10. Dan hanya pada pertemuan antara mereka bertiga di dalam kereta SP10 pada malam itu keputusan untuk hanya menjual 3 kilo ganja dengan harga RM1,600 sekilo dicapai dengan SP10 menunjukkan wang pembayaran yang dibawa disusuli tindakan T1 pergi mengambil dadah tersebut dan membawanya kepada SP10 dan T2 yang menunggu. Tetapi serbuan polis telah membantutkan penyempurnaan penjualan itu dengan penyerahan dadah dan pembayaran harganya, dengan itu pertuduhan dipinda oleh pihak pendakwaan. Dakwaan bahawa T2 hanya hadir sama dengan tidak dibuktikan memiliki adalah meleset. Pendakwa tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan oleh T2. Dia telah dibuktikan bukan sahaja hadir tetapi merupakan perancang utama yang telah merancang bersama T1 dan secara aktif melaksanakan rancangan bersama mereka hingga dadah yang hendak dijual itu disediakan dan di bawa oleh T1 untuk diserahkan kepada SP10 pada tarikh dan waktu yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. Dengan itu, hujah peguam didapati tidak berasas dan ditolak.

[44] Peguam juga berhujah bahawa pendakwa hanya berjaya membuktikan perbicangan oleh T2 dan itu tidak terjumlah kepada mengedar. Sebagai authoriti beliau bersandar kepada kes Shariff bin Kadir v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 203 di mana mahkamah ini telah membatalkan sabitan atas kesalahan mengedar dan menggantikannya dengan kesalahan memiliki dadah. Kami dapati kes itu jauh berbeza dari segi fakta kerana pengedaran dadah di situ berasaskan pemilikan dan anggapan berganda ss 37(d) dan 37(da) ADB yang mana tidak relevan bagi kes yang dirayu. Seperti diterangkan di atas, peranan T2 yang dibuktikan telah memenuhi semua intipati pertuduhan yang dihadapinya. Oleh itu hujah ini juga gagal.

[45] Dalam semua hal keadaan kes ini, kami dapati hujah-hujah perayu gagal menunjukkan berlaku apa-apa salah arah atau kesilapan menilai keterangan oleh Yang Arif Hakim perbicaraan dalam mencapai keputusannya. Kami mendapati

6 MLJ 197 at 212

keterangan yang lebih daripada mencukupi telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwa untuk membuktikan pertuduhan yang dihadapi oleh T1 dan T2 melampaui imbangan kebarangkalian. Kami juga puas hati kenyataan pembelaan T1 dan T2 telah diberi penelitian dan pertimbangan sewajarnya dan tidak menimbulkan keraguan yang menasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan.[46] Sebaliknya, pembelaan mereka bukan sahaja mengesahkan kehadiran mereka bersama di tempat dan masa dalam pertuduhan tetapi juga tidak mempertikai atau menafikan keterangan-keterangan yang mebuktikan perancangan mereka itu serta segala tindakan mereka bagi mencapai tujuan bersama. Reaksi mereka kepada tindakan polis tidak mencerminkan orang yang tidak bersalah.

[47] Kami dengan itu menolak rayuan perayu-perayu dan mengekalkan sabitan serta hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh Yang Arif Hakim perbicaraan. Atas sebab-sebab yang tidak dapat dielakkan, penghakiman ini hanya dapat disiapkan selepas persaraan saudara kami, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman HMP yang pada masa itu mempengerusikan panel rayuan ini.

Rayuan ditolak. Sabitan dan hukuman dikekalkan.
Categories: CaseLaws

LYN HONG YAP v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CA KL MATHEW CJ, BROWN AG CJ (S) AND WILSON J FM CRIMINAL REFERENCE NO 2 OF 1953 2 December 1953 [1956] 1 MLJ 226

[1956] 1 MLJ 226
LYN HONG YAP v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CA KL

MATHEW CJ, BROWN AG CJ (S) AND WILSON J

FM CRIMINAL REFERENCE NO 2 OF 1953

2 December 1953
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, 1950, s 12 — Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 6), s 422 — Consent of Public Prosecutor — Validity of consent — Whether want of consent curable — Practice where a consent or sanction is required

In this case the facts proved at the time relating to the question of consent were as follows: On June 13, 1952 the Police applied to the Magistrate at Kuala Kangsar for a summons to issue against the appellant in respect of an offence committed “on a day between 17th and 19th April 1952”. On June 19 the Magistrate made an order for the Summons to issue and it was issued on June 21. On July 1, the Dy. Public Prosecutor signed a document of consent under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance. The charge to which the appellant was called on to plead on July 3 and on which he was tried was that he had committed an offence under section 3(b) of the said Ordinance and punishable under section 3(c). Throughout the trial in the Sessions Court not a word was said by either of the two counsel who at different times represented the appellant as to the validity of the consent of the Public Prosecutor or as to any want of consent. The point was raised for the first time at the hearing of the second appeal and then in answer to a question of Thomson J. the Dy. Public Prosecutor informed the Court after going through his papers that his colleague in office who had signed the consent of July 1, 1952 had in fact given his consent to the institution of the proceedings and indeed had instructed them to be instituted on June 2, 1952, that was some eleven days before the application for process by the Police.

Thomson J. accepted this assurance and dismissed the appeal. The learned Judge held that the want of consent under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance is not an omission that can be cured by reason of section 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of Thomson J. and held that the consent of the Public Prosecutor in this case was not defective, and that the trial of the appellant was not a nullity.

The Court of Appeal further suggested that difficulties which might arise in cases where a consent or sanction is required, could be avoided if the practice were adopted on accompanying every application for a summons or a warrant of arrest with the consent or sanction in writing.

Cases referred to

R v Bates 6 Cr App R 153

R v Metz 11 Cr App R 164

Hori Ram Singh v R AIR 1939 PC 43 50

Gill v R AIR 1948 PC 128 133

Morarka v R AIR 1948 PC 82

Chong Tuck Loong v Public Prosecutor Perak Cr App No 73/1952 — Unreported

THOMSON J

The judgment of the Court below was as follows:

The appellant in this case appeared before the Sessions Court at Kuala Kangsar on 3rd July, 1952, charged with an offence in contravention of section 3 (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, 1950. He claimed trial and was represented by Counsel. At the close of the case for the prosecution the learned President decided that there was no case to answer and acquitted and discharged him.

Against that order of acquittal and discharge the Public Prosecutor appealed and on 18th December, 1952, the appeal was allowed, the order of acquittal was set aside and the case was remitted to the Sessions Court to be further dealt with according to law. I am not concerned here with the matters that were at issue in that appeal.

On 22nd January, 1953, the case again came before the Sessions Court when the appellant was represented by a different Counsel. In the event, the appellant was convicted and fined $750 or nine months rigorous imprisonment in default of payment.

Against that conviction appellant appealed on a number of grounds the only ones of which I am concerned with here being certain grounds relating to the question of whether the consent of the Public Prosecutor given under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was defective and whether therefore the Sessions Court was without jurisdiction and the trial was therefore a nullity.

The facts proved at the time relating to this question of consent are as follows.

On 13th June, 1952, the Police applied to the Magistrate at Kuala Kangsar for a summons to issue against the appellant in respect of an offence committed “on a day between 17th and 19th April, 1952”. On 19th June the Magistrate made an order for the summons to issue and it was issued on 21st June. On 1st July, the Deputy Public Prosecutor signed a document in the following terms:—

Consent under Section 12.

“Under the provisions of section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, 1950, I, Matthew Gilbert Neal, Deputy Public Prosecutor, Perak, hereby consent to the

1956 1 MLJ 226 at 227

prosecution of one LYN HONG YAP for an offence punishable under section 3(b) of the aforesaid Ordinance, alleged to have been committed at Liman, Kati, Kuala Kangsar, between 19th-20th April, 1952.Dated at Ipoh this 1st day of July, 1952.

(Sd.) M. G. Neal,
Deputy Public Prosecutor,
Perak.”

and the charge to which the appellant was called on to plead on 3rd July and on which he was tried was as follows:—

“That you on a day between 17th and 20th April, 1952 at 1.30 p.m. at No. 5 New Village, Liman Kati, in the district of Kuala Kangsar did corruptly agree to give a sum of $50 to an agent, namely, K. Retnasingam, Health Inspector, as an inducement to him to show favour to one Lee Kow in a matter in relation to the said K. Retnasingam’s principal affairs, namely, to grant the said Lee Kow a licence for Coffee and eating shop and that you have thereby committed an offence under Section 3(b) of Prevention of Corruption Ordinance No. 5 of 1950 and punishable under Section 3(c) of the same Ordinance.”

Throughout the trial in the Sessions Court not a word was said by either of the two Counsel who at different times represented the appellant as to the validity of the consent of the Public Prosecutor or as to any want of consent. The point was raised for the first time at the hearing of the second appeal and then in answer to a question by myself the Deputy Public Prosecutor who was appearing for the respondent informed me after going through his papers that his colleague in office who had signed the paper bearing the date 1st July, 1952, had in fact given his consent to the institution of the present proceedings and indeed had instructed them to be instituted on 2nd June, 1952, that is some 11 days before the application for process by the Police.

I accepted that assurance given from the Bar and having considered the other Grounds of Appeal and being of the opinion that it was abundantly clear on the evidence that the appellant had in fact committed the offence charged against him, I dismissed the appeal. I intimated, however, that if I were asked to do so I would give my certificate to allow the matter to be taken further.

The real question which arose on the appeal was not any question of what constitutes or does not constitute a valid consent by the Public Prosecutor but what course this Court should take when such a question is raised for the first time on appeal.

In my opinion the answer is to be found in an examination of the two English cases of Rex v Bates 6 Cr App R 153 and Rex v Metz 11 Cr App R 164.

In Bate’s case the appellant was convicted of an offence under the Explosives Substances Act, 1883, for the prosecution of which the consent of the Attorney-General was required. Although the point was not raised at the trial, and was indeed not raised by the appellant himself in the appeal, Counsel for the Crown stated from the Bar that he had ascertained that the consent of the Attorney-General was in fact not obtained. On that, the Court quashed the conviction on the ground that the absence of the consent of the Attorney-General took away the jurisdiction of the trial Court.

In Metz’s case the appellant had been convicted of an offence against the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, for the institution of a prosecution for which the consent of the Attorney-General was necessary. No evidence was given at the trial that such consent had been obtained but at the trial the point of want of consent was not taken. At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for the Crown informed the Court from the Bar that the fiat of the Attorney-General, which apparently was in writing, had been produced at the Police Court and so came to the Court of trial (the Central Criminal Court) attached to the depositions. The appeal was dismissed. In dismissing it Lord Reading, observed that two points had been taken on behalf of the appellant and went on to say:—

“The first is that it is necessary that the consent of the Attorney-General should be given before a prosecution is instituted; under s. 1(4) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. It is not suggested that the prosecution was in fact instituted without the necessary consent, but it is said that there was no evidence of it at the trial. The point was not taken at the trial. As we now know, the consent was in fact proved at the police court. The document was in Court at the trial, but it was not formally proved. If the point had been taken at the trial the defect would have been immediately cured, so the point is a pure technicality. We do not think it possible for the point now to succeed in this Court when there was an opportunity for counsel to take it in the Court below if he desired.”

He went on to distinguish the case from that of Bates supra as follows:—

“Our attention has been called to the case of Bates, where the objection was taken that consent had not in fact been obtained, which is a totally different matter; it was there pointed out by Lord Alverstone that although the point had not been taken below it was necessary that there should be consent before the prosecution was instituted. No consent had been obtained, so the conviction was quashed.”

I was unable to find any distinction in principle between Metz’s case and the present case. In Metz’s case the Court accepted the assurance of counsel that the consent of the Attorney-General was in fact in existence and in the present case I accepted the assurance of Counsel that the consent of the Deputy Public Prosecutor (which, it is to be remembered, is not required to be in writing) was in fact in existence before the institution of the prosecution. In the circumstances, I did not feel it was necessary to examine the actual evidence on the point that was given at the trial. If Counsel for the appellant had wished to take the point he should have done so at the trial. If he had done so, it would have been open to the prosecution to ask for an adjournment to enable the Deputy Public

1956 1 MLJ 226 at 228

Prosecutor to appear in person when I have no doubt he would have made the same statement as he made at the hearing of the appeal. If an adjournment had not been granted and the point had succeeded the result would have been not an order of acquittal but an order dismissing the complaint and thus it would have been left open to the prosecution to institute further proceedings after a valid consent had been obtained. (See Hori Ram Singh v R AIR 1939 PC 43 50).I was fortified in this view by certain observations made by Lord Simonds in the case of Gill v R AIR 1948 PC 128 133. In that case their Lordships were concerned inter alia with the question of whether a sanction to a prosecution given under section 197 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code was invalid by reason of the necessary facts not having been laid before the sanctioning authority. An inference had been drawn from certain circumstances that the necessary facts had been laid before the sanctioning authority and Lord Simonds observed:—

“It is an inference, which at this late stage of the proceedings cannot properly be challenged, that the same facts were before the sanctioning authority when the sanction was given. If it was desired to raise such a question, that should have been done at the earliest moment when the prosecution could have supported by evidence the inference which even without it can fairly be drawn.”

I would add that I do not think that what I have said is in any way inconsistent with the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Morarka v R AIR 1948 PC 82. In that case the appellant had been convicted under an Indian statute relating to the control of cotton clothing which provided that no prosecution under it should be instituted without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government concerned, and the Court held that the sanction which had in fact been given was defective. The only material before the Court apparently consisted of the evidence given at the original trial and I fail to see that the decision has any bearing on the question at issue in the case of Rex v Metz 11 Cr App R 164 supra or in the present case.

In this connection, I have had occasion to consider my own judgment in the case of Chong Tuck Loong v Public Prosecutor Perak Cr App No 73/1952 — Unreported, in which I discussed this question of consent under the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance at some length. In that judgment I made the following observations:—

“… if that section (Section 12) is not complied with the Court has no jurisdiction to try offences under the Ordinance, and I do not think it can be said to be complied with unless it is clear either on the face of the proceedings or as a matter of reasonable inference that the Public Prosecutor (or, by reason of section 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Solicitor-General or a duly appointed Deputy Public Prosecutor) has either taken an active part in the prosecution or has consented to the charges brought against the accused after applying his mind at the lowest to the facta probanda forming the material of these charges.”

In making these observations I was concerned with the particular facts of the case under appeal and my attention had not been invited to Metz’s case. On further consideration I have come to the conclusion that in making these observations I went too far and that they would more accurately state the law if the words, “either on the face of the proceedings or as a matter of reasonable inference” were omitted.

To avoid misunderstanding and to ensure a full examination of the question, I should say that in my opinion want of consent under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance is not an omission that can be cured by reason of section 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On that point to my mind the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Morarka v R AIR 1948 PC 82, supra, is conclusive. It is true that in that case their Lordships were concerned with section 537 Of the Indian Code which does not contain the specific reference to sanctions which occurs in section 422 of our Code. It is to be noted, however, that until 1923 section 537 of the Indian Code did contain a reference to sanctions required under section 195 of that Code (our section 129) which was repealed in that year. An examination of the Indian decisions prior to 1923 (see the cases set out in the A.I.R. Commentary of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code at Vol. III pp. 2984-5) shows that the Indian Courts consistently held that the reference was only to sanctions required under the Indian section 195 and did not include sanctions under any other statutory provision.

MATHEW CJ

COURT OF APPEAL (Criminal Reference).

S. P. Seenivasagam for the appellant.

L. Talog Davies (Federal Counsel) for the respondent.

This is a Reference under section 34 of the Courts Ordinance. The point for our determination is:—

“Whether the consent of the Public Prosecutor in this case was defective and whether the trial of the appellant was thereby a nullity.”

We are in complete agreement with the very full and clear grounds of judgment delivered by Thomson J., and there is nothing that we can profitably add to what has been said therein. In consequence, we hold that the consent of the Public Prosecutor this case is not defective, and that the trial of the appellant was not a nullity.

We would suggest that difficulties of this kind, which might arise in cases where a consent or sanction is required, could be avoided if the practice were adopted of accompanying every application for a summons or a warrant of arrest with the consent or sanction in writing.

Order accordingly.
Solicitors: S Seenivasagam & Sons.